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HOW TO READ THOMAS PIKETTY’S CAPITAL
Gordon Lloyd
Dockson Emeritus Professor of Public Policy, Pepperdine University
Senior Fellow, Ashbrook Center
Piketty in His Own Words
Thomas Piketty. Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press, 2014.
Piketty Introduction
Right below the introduction heading, we get a blurb cited by Piketty from The
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, Article 1, 1789: “Social
distinctions can be based only on common utility.” (1)
Piketty’s point of departure is that the debate over income and wealth distribution
“has long been based on an abundance of (class) prejudice and a paucity of fact.” (2)
The classical liberals of the late 18th and 19th centuries were driven by “fear of
revolution in France.” (4) They were also driven by wrong economic and contrary
assumptions; Ricardo’s error was that he argued “the price system knows neither
limits nor morality.” (6) And that the “the principle application of Ricardo’s principle
of scarcity” is the “possibility of a large and lasting divergence in the distribution of
wealth” is “linked to extreme changes in certain relative prices.” (7) The trend of
unprecedented concentration of inequality since the 1840s stabilized between 1870
and 1914. We now know that without the shocks of war, inequality would have
returned. Piketty admits, “Marx’s prophecy came no closer to being realized than
Ricardo’s.” (9) Nevertheless, Marx’s “principle of infinite accumulation …contains a
key insight” (10): Accumulation ends at a finite level, but that level may be “high
enough to be destabilizing.” See the 1980s plus. (10)
Piketty then turns from the apocalyptic 19th century to what he calls “the fairy tale” of
Simon Kuznets and Robert Solow in the 2Oth century of decreasing inequality within
advanced capitalism. (11) Kuznets ”noted a sharp reduction in income inequality in
the United States between 1913 and1948.” (12) He used ”objective data” for the first
time. (13) But, says Piketty, this move toward equality was “accidental” and Kuznets
knew that the “Kuznets curve” showing the reduction in inequality had more to do
with the shocks of war and depression than “with any natural and automatic process”
(13) of “the inevitability of a “balanced growth path.” (15) It was also “a product of
the Cold War” (14-15) to propose the “optimistic view of the relation between
economic development and the distribution of wealth.” (16)
“Since the1970s, income inequality has increased significantly in the rich countries.”
(15) For this reason we need to put income distribution back on the agenda and
engage in a historically reliable, data driven comparison of various countries in order
to study “the dynamics of income and wealth distribution over the long run.” (19)
The premise of the book is that inequality is bad and there are no justifiable reasons
for it! Piketty advocates the principles of 1789 France to achieve a just social order.
(31) His whole point is that income equality is due to shocks and wars and is not the
result of a rational or evolutionary or spontaneous economic process. In the end the

history of distribution boils down to what the “relevant actors” consider to be justice
and the influence they have to implement that vision. (20)
Another oddity, a sort of unintentional bow to classical liberalism, is that the
“compression of inequalities” is due mainly to “the diffusion of knowledge and
investment in training and skills.” (21, 22) Yet, Piketty adds, this is fundamentally to
be done by “public policy” rather than “a market mechanism.” (21) It requires
conscious educational policies providing genuine access. But there are “forces of
divergence” at work. Most importantly “there are a set of divergence associated with
the process of accumulation and concentration of wealth when growth is weak and the
return on capital is high.”
“It no doubt represents the principal threat to an equal distribution of wealth in the
long run.” (23)
Between 1910 and 1948, the top decile share of national income in the US was 45%50% through 1940 and then dropped to about 35% by 1950. Between 1950 and 1980,
the share remained in 35% range. Between 1980 and 2010, it has risen steady back up
to 50%. Why? “Top managers by and large have the power to set their own
remuneration.” (24) Piketty’s second diagram shows the fundamental inequality of
wealth in Europe as an equation r > g. “where r stands for the annual rate of return on
capital” and g “stands for the rate of growth of the economy.” (25) For Piketty, this r
> g formula “sums up the logic of all my conclusions.” (25) Another way of putting it
is that “inherited wealth grows faster than output and income.” (260) And this has
nothing to do with market imperfection. But Piketty is not apocalyptic like Marx; he
argues that “a progressive global tax on capita” would narrow the r-g relationship in a
fair and efficient manner. (27)
Piketty intends to focus on the UK and France. The French Revolution established
estate records. And in France the inheritance factor is more important than in the US
because of “the demographic growth of the New World.” (29) The French case of
slow population growth “is more typical and more pertinent for understanding the
future.” (29) Moreover the French Revolution “quickly established an ideal of legal
equality in relation to the market.” The British left standing royalty and aristocracy,
and the American Revolution “allowed slavery to continue for nearly a century and
legal discrimination for nearly two centuries… In a way, the French Revolution of
1789 was more ambitious. It abolished al legal privileges and sought to create a
political and social order based entirely on equal rights and opportunities.” (30)
Part One: Income and Capital
Part One reviews the concepts of income and capital and the main stages of their
growth.
“How should income from production be divided between labor and capital?” (39)
What is the “evolution of the labor-capital split since the eighteenth century?” (41)
Contrary to contemporary opinion, the labor-capital/wealth split is not stable in the
past and won’t be in the future. β = capital (stock)/income (flow) ratio. The first
fundamental law of capitalism: α (capital’s share in income) = r (the rate of return on
capital) x β. We have vast “global inequality.” (64) This can’t be overcome simply

by free markets but by the diffusion of knowledge, which is “associated with the
achievement of legitimate and efficient government.” (71)
Piketty introduces his notion of “the convergence process.” (72) Poorer countries are
catching up with richer countries by investing in themselves. But catch-up is
abnormal; slow growth is the norm. This is true for demographic growth, which has
only expanded between 1700 (600 million) and 2012 (7 billion) and could just as well
decline as continue to grow. “Other things being equal, strong demographic growth
tends to play an equalizing role because it decreases the importance of inherited
wealth: every generation must in some sense construct itself.” (83) Spectacular
economic growth also took place during that time period. We have shifted in both
France and the US from an agricultural economy in 1800 to a manufacturing economy
in 1900 to a service economy in 2000.
But are we about to see an end to the increase in per capita output? “The key point is
that there is no historical example of a country at the world technological frontier
whose growth in per capita output exceeded 1.5% over a lengthy period of time.”
(93) “History and logic show” that an expected growth rate of 3%-4% is “illusory.”
(93-94) Piketty thinks 1.2% is more probable, “but cannot be achieved, however,
unless new sources of energy are developed to replace hydrocarbons, which are
rapidly being depleted.”
“In my view, the most important point…is that a per capita output growth rate on the
order of 1% is in fact extremely rapid, much more rapid than many people think.”
(95) It requires a society that embraces “deep and permanent change.” (96) We need
to create specific institutions for the purpose and not rely solely on market forces or
technological progress.” (96)
“To recapitulate, global growth over the last three centuries can be pictured as a bell
curve with a very high peak.” (99)
Essentially inflation—“largely a 20th century phenomenon”-- “allowed the wealthy
countries to get rid of the public debt they owed at the end of World War II. Inflation
also led to various redistributions among social groups over the course of the
twentieth century.” (103) By contrast, the wealth based economy of the 18th and 19th
centuries was linked to great monetary stability. The French Revolution of 1789 was
an exception. The world of stable money “collapsed for good with World War I.”
(106) “Governments went deeply into debt.” (106)
Part Two: The Dynamics of the Capital/Income Ratio
This section looks at the “main evolution of the capital stock” by way of French and
British literature. (113) In the 19th century wealth took the form of land or
government bonds. Since producing “a reliable and steady income” is the whole
point of 21st Century capital markets, there is much to learn from the 19th Century.
Unlike during the 19th Century, however, we can not now clearly identify to whom we
currently owe the government debt. But more importantly, has modern capital
become more “dynamic” and less “rent seeking”? (116) Has there been a
metamorphosis or decomposition of capital? (118)

National Capital=farmland +housing+ other domestic capital+ net foreign capital.
(119) Between 1700 and 2000 farmland dropped from 2/3 to under 10% of national
capital. “The nature of capital has changed: it once was mainly land but has become
primarily housing plus industrial assets. Yet capital has lost none of its importance.”
(120) Capital went through shocks in the early 20th century and revived after WWII.
In 2010, in both the UK and France, private wealth “accounts for virtually all of
national wealth in both countries.” (125) “In other words, the history of the ratio of
national capital to national income in France and Britain since the eighteenth century,
summarized earlier, has largely been the history of the relation between private capital
and national income.” (126) And government going to war in the 19th century led to a
high level of public debt and this led to increased private wealth in both countries.
(130) However in the 20th Century when government went to war, it was unclear who
was doing the lending. And “debt was drowned by inflation and repaid with money
of decreasing value.” (132)
The Great Depression “durably discredited” the doctrine of laissez-faire. (136) And
Schumpeter and Samuelson held the Soviet “statist economic system” in high regard.
(137) “In 1950, the government of France owned 25-30 percent of the nation’s
wealth, and perhaps even a little more.” (137) This mixed economy was “capitalism
without capitalists.” (138) But this changed after 1980 with the arrival of the
deregulation and privatization movement. France “became the promised land of the
new private-ownership capitalism of the twenty-first century.” (138)
So capital went through metamorphoses but in the end, “its total amount relative to
income scarcely changed at all.” (140) Piketty wants to get to the question: “what
fundamentally determines the capital/income ratio in the long run.” (149) But to get
there Piketty expands his French and British model to other parts of Europe and the
New World. “The United States enjoyed a much more stable capital/income ratio than
Europe in the twentieth century, perhaps explaining why Americans seem to take a
more benign view of capitalism than Europeans.” (154) Moreover foreign capital had
little influence in America. (155) “The net foreign asset position of the United States
has at times been slightly negative, at other times slightly positive, but these positions
were always of relatively limited importance compared with the total stock of capital
owned by US citizens.” (156) He ends hid old world-new world coverage with
references to slavery in he new world. “All told, southern slave owners in the New
World controlled more wealth the landlords of old Europe.” (160) There were
virtually no slaves in he north. ”This complex and contradictory relation to inequality
largely persists in the United States to this day.” (161) “The first fundamental law of
capitalism “is “beta=alpha/r.” (162)
Piketty now turns to the capital/income ratio over the long run and introduces “the
second fundamental law of capitalism: β =s / g where β is the capital- (national rather
than disposable) income ratio and it is related in a simple way to the savings rate - s and the growth rate -g. (166) This is a dynamic process. The first fundamental law
was explained in Chapter 1: α = r x β where alpha is the share of capital in national
income and is equal to the rate of return on capital— r —times the capital/income
ratio— β. (168) “There is indeed a long-term trend in all of the rich countries in the
period 1970-2010.” (172) Private capitalism is making a strong comeback. He calls
this “patrimonial capitalism.” (173) Piketty includes profit/business capital and real

estate, but not durable goods, in s and includes demographic growth in g. So the
increase in β between 1970 and 2010 in rich countries is due to high s plus low g
along with privatization and the “catch up” of asset prices. (183) “This historical
catch up process is now complete.” (188) Piketty anticipates that β will continue to
grow in the 21st century.
Piketty turns finally in Part Two to the Capital-Labor split or the division of national
income between capital and labor in the 21st century. (199) If we can determine the
value of α (capital income made up of rent, profits, dividends, and interest) then the
remainder is the share going to labor. α was around 40% in France and UK in the19th
century and is now at about 30% having dipped to the low 20s in the middle of the
20th century. (200) There has been a decrease in the pure return on capital in the long
run from 4-5% in the 19th century to 3-4% today. (208) Why? Social and economic
forces change over time. (212) Piketty rejects the marginal productivity of capital
notion. And he also rejects the Cobb-Douglas/Keynes stable capital-labor ratio. (220)
The K-L substitution ratio in the 21st C will have an elasticity >1. (220) So how does
this relate to Marx? (227) “Marx usually adopted a fairly anecdotal and unsystematic
approach to the available statistics.” (229) We have data in the 21st C concerning “the
law β =s / g” (233) and α = r x β.
“To sum up: modern growth, which is based on the growth of productivity and the
difference of knowledge, has made it possible to avoid the apocalypse predicted by
Marx and to balance the process of capital accumulation. But it has not altered the
deep structure of capital—or at any rate has not truly reduced the macroeconomic
importance of capital relative to labor. I must now examine whether the same is true
for inequality in the distribution of income and wealth. How much has the structure
of inequality with respect to both labor and capital actually changed since the
nineteenth century?” (234)
Part Three: The Structure of Inequality
Inequality and Concentration: Preliminary Bearings. Part One defined income as “the
sum of income from labor and income from capital.” (242) Part Two looked at “the
dynamics of both the capital/income ratio at the country level and the overall split of
national income between capital and labor.” (237)
Part Three examines income and wealth inequality at the individual level. Part Two
showed the shocks of war. The 21st century has seen the return of “patrimonial
capitalism.” This is not something new but a return to the low growth of the 19th
century. In Part Three, contra Kuznets, Piketty will show that WWI and II and “public
policies that followed them, played a central role in reducing inequalities in the
twentieth century.” (237) Inequality, he states, has returned since the 1970s. And he
will show the increased importance of inherited wealth over labor from income.
“Many people believe that modern growth naturally favors labor over inheritance and
competence over birth. What is the source of this belief, and how sure can we be that
it is correct?” (237) Will inequality be greater in 21st century than 19th century?
Income from capital is more concentrated than the distribution of income from labor.
(244) What is the current structure of inequality at the individual level?
“In every society, whether France in 1789 (when 1-2 percent of the population
belonged to the aristocracy) or the United States in 2011 (when the Occupy Wall

Street movement aimed its criticism at the richest 1 percent of the population), the top
centile is a large enough group to exert a significant influence on both the social
landscape and the political and economic order.” (254) And inequality from capital is
always larger than inequalities from income.
“The growth of a true ‘patrimonial (or propertied) middle class’ was the principal
structural transformation of the distribution of wealth in the developed countries in
the twentieth centuries.” (260) “I want to insist on this point: the key issue is the
justification of inequality rather than the magnitude as such. That is why it is essential
to analyze the structure of inequality.” (264) There are two ways of achieving
inequality: 1) inheritance, or rentiers, and 2) super managers of merit (See in
particular, pp. 276-278).
Piketty then turns to the changed structure of inequality. “The shocks of the period
1914-1945 played an essential role in the compression of inequality, and this
compression was in no way a harmonious or spontaneous occurrence. The increase in
inequality since 1970 has not been the same everywhere, which again suggests that
institutional and political factors played a key role.” (271)
He notes the reduction in inequality in France in the twentieth century with the arrival
of the managers, “The top docile always encompasses two very different worlds: ‘the
9 percent,’ in which income from labor clearly predominates, and ‘the 1 percent,’ in
which income from capital becomes progressively more important.” (280) “The
foregoing discussion demonstrates the usefulness of breaking income down by
centiles and income source.” (286) “In every country the history of inequality is
political—and historical.” (286)
The transformation of inequality in the United States is more complex than in France.
The New Deal and WWII “substantially compressed” income inequality. (293) But
this compression was less than in France. There was an “explosion of US inequality
after 1980.” (294) The financial crisis of the early 2000s did not alter this structural
dynamic; in fact, “there is absolutely no doubt that the increase in inequality in the
United States contributed to the nation’s financial instability.” (297) The “structural
increase in the capital/income ratio” also was a contributing factor. (298)
“Let me return now to the causes of rising inequality in the United States. The
increase was largely the result of the unprecedented increase in wage inequality and in
particular the emergence of extremely high remunerations at the summit of the wage
hierarchy, particularly among top managers at large firms.” (298) The US now
represents the world of the super manager.
He examines the “dynamics of labor income inequality. What caused the explosion of
wage inequalities and the rise of the super manager in the United States after 1980?”
(304) Later he will answer the question: “why has the concentration of wealth
decreased everywhere…since the turn of the twentieth century?” (304) The answer
lies in understanding the emergence of a “patrimonial middle class”. (304)
Marginal productivity analysis is an inadequate explanation for income distribution.
He has a specific section called “The Illusion of Marginal Productivity.” (330-333)
“Inequalities at the bottom of the US wage distribution have closely followed the

evolution of the minimum wage.” (310) “Over the long run, minimum wages and
wage schedules cannot multiply wages by factors of five or ten: to achieve that level
of progress, education and technology are the decisive forces.” (313) But education
cannot explain why the top 1% “have seen their remuneration take off.” (315) What
about the invisible hand at work? “In practice, the invisible hand does not exist, any
more than ‘pure and perfect’ competition does, and the market is always embodied in
specific institutions such as corporate hierarchies and compensation committees.”
(332) It is mostly about “social norms of fair remuneration.” (333) “During the 1980s
English speaking countries reduced the top marginal income tax rate.” That is a major
reason for the increase in income inequality.
Inequality of Capital Ownership: Today, capital ownership is becoming increasingly
concentrated and thus may become more problematic than the unequal distribution
between super managers and others. (336) Once there was a middle class that
moderated the inequality of wealth. This happened in France after the Revolution;
but reversed itself later in the 19th and 20th centuries until the eve of WWI.
“Three questions will concern us in the remainder of this chapter. Why were
inequalities of wealth so extreme, and increasing, before World War I? And why,
despite the fact that wealth is once again prospering at the beginning of the twentyfirst century as it did at the beginning of the twentieth century (as the evolution of the
capital/income ratio shows), is the concentration of wealth today significantly below
its historical high? Finally, is this state of affairs irreversible?” (346) The “major
structural transformation was the emergence of a middle group.” (347)
Wealth in the US became increasingly concentrated during the 19th century. Then
came the progressives. “Perceptions of inequality, redistribution, and national identity
changed a great deal over the course of the twentieth century, to put it mildly.” (349)
Inequality dropped between 1910 and 1950. But it is back up again.
The European wave of enthusiasm between 1945-1975: capitalism was finally killed
“and that inequality and class society had been relegated to the past.” (350) What
went wrong after 1980 about not controlling the excesses of capitalism? The United
States, by contrast never had “a great leap forward in social justice. Indeed, inequality
of wealth there is greater today than it was at the beginning of the nineteenth
century.” (350)
The r (the return on capital) is < than g (the growth rate) in the 20th century. The r
was under 2% between 1913 and 2010 but it was less than g. But this is not a natural
or inevitable situation. The theory of time preference goes some way to explain the
level of r. ”All signs are, however, that it is about to end,” and return to 19th century
levels (356) of r > g. We need to examine r > g “as a historical reality dependent on
a variety of mechanisms and not as an absolute logical necessity.” (361) Over time r
is about 4-5% and g is about 1%. And this is “a powerful force for a more unequal
distribution of wealth.” (360)
The French Revolutionary tradition persists in France today: no primogeniture, no
entails, and inheritance taxes. Piketty says that France introduced the “principle of
equal division of property, among brothers and sisters.” (362) Yet Piketty claims this
principle of equality was based on “a principle of liberty and economic efficiency.”

(363) The main point for Piketty is that both the French Revolution and the American
Revolution were similar with regard to inherited property.
His next point is clear: given the principles of the French Revolution, how come the
continued concentration of wealth in 19th century France? “Clearly, equality of rights
and opportunities is not enough to ensure an egalitarian distribution of wealth.” (364)
Answer: r > g. But there is no simple Gini number to measure inequality nor is there
a Pareto inequality equilibrium. The shocks of 1914-1945 explain the reduction of
inequality because of the impact on r. “In France and Britain, foreign assets virtually
disappeared after the two world wars.” (370) “The more surprising part at first glance,
and in a way the more interesting part, is that the concentration of wealth never
recovered from the shocks I have been discussing.” (372) That is, concentration did
not start to approach the earlier levels until the 1980s and 2000-2010. (372) Why?
The major reason is “that governments in the twentieth century began taxing capital
and its income at significant rates.” (373) This, along with progressive income tax and
estate taxes, led to “the rise of the middle class.” (374)
So the question Piketty turns to now is will the 21st century be eventually be even
more in egalitarian than the 19th century? It is “an illusion” to think “the nature of
modern growth or the laws of the market economy ensures that inequality of wealth
ensures that inequality of wealth will decrease and harmonious stability will be
achieved.” (376) It all depends on what happens to governmental tax laws. The form
of capital has certainly changed from land to financial, industrial, and real estate.
There is a now a patrimonial middle class that own between 1/4 and 1/3 of total
wealth. The wealthiest 10% now own 2/3 rather than the 9/10ths they owned in the
19th century. And pay attention to r-g over the years. When r-g “is significantly and
durably higher” (377) then “it is all but inevitable” (378) that inherited wealth rather
than earned wealth twill play a larger role. That is the probability of the 21st century.
The “key question” is the breakdown between wealth created by work and wealth
created by inheritance. Inheritance flow in France was 20% in 19th century, down to
4% by 1950 and is now 14%. Piketty examines, in turn, three forces that influence
the inheritance flow. He is particularly interested in whether the importance of
inheritance decreases because people live longer and inheritors inherit later. Part of
this interest is to question the Modigliani theory that people (only) save for retirement
and the goal is to end up with nothing when you die.
According to Piketty, “the desire to perpetuate the family fortune has always played a
central role,” thus the importance of inheritance and gift giving prior to death. (391,
393) In this regard, says Piketty, only 15-20% of retirements in English speaking
countries are funded by annuities. It is only 5% in France.
The period 1914 to 1950, especially WWII, “reset all counters to zero, or close to
zero, and inevitably resulted in a rejuvenation of wealth. In this respect, it was indeed
the two world wars that wiped the slate clean in the twentieth century and created the
illusion that capitalism had been overcome.” (397)
So what does this tell us about the future of the 21st century? It all depends on how
wide the gap between r and g is. And how much of r is due to inheritance and how
much to work? He is impressed by how “we have moved from a society with a small

number of very wealthy rentiers to one with a much larger number of less wealthy
rentiers: a society of petites rentiers if you will.” (420)
In a funny sort of way, Piketty’s argument for equality presupposes a liberty
component. “Our democratic societies rest on a meritocratic worldview, or at any rate
a meritocratic hope, by which I mean a belief in a society in which inequality is based
more on merit and effort than on kinship and rents.” (422) But the inequality must be
based on the “common utility” provision of ARTICLE ONE OF THE 1789 FRENCH
DECLARATION. So the liberty involved does not stand on its own footing as an
individual right; it is contingent on something higher: the common utility or the
general welfare.
He turns now to the issue of global inequality of wealth in the 21st century. Forbes
claims there were 140 billionaires in 1987 in the world and 1,400 in 2013. (433)
“Since the 1980s, global wealth has increased on average a little faster than
income…and the largest fortunes grew much more rapidly than average wealth. This
is the new fact that Forbes rankings help us bring to light, assuming they are reliable.”
(435) “Global inequality of wealth in the early 2010s appears to be comparable in
magnitude to that observed in Europe in 1900-2010” (438). “One of the most striking
lessons of the Forbes rankings is that, past a certain threshold, all large fortunes,
whether inherited or entrepreneurial in origin, grow at extremely high rates, regardless
of whether the owner of the fortune works or not.” (439) The point? “Capital grows
according to a dynamic of its own.” (440) He estimates that 60-70% of the wealth is
inherited rather than earned.
I never did understand why Piketty stuck with the distinction between inherited
wealth and earned wealth for so long. He now finally comes clean and abandons the
distinction. R > g turns entrepreneurs into rentiers. That is why we need a world
wide progressive annual tax. The argument that there is “a moral hierarchy of wealth”
in practice amounts to “an exercise in Western ethnocentrism.” (445) So much for the
slim claim that here is a distinction between inherited and earned wealth.
Part Four: Regulating Capital in the 21st C
“In the first three parts of this book, I analyzed the evolution of the distribution of
wealth and the structure of inequality since the eighteenth century. From this analysis
I must now try to draw lessons for the future.” (471) The 20th century wars wiped out
the inequality of the past. Inequality is returning in the 21st century. The object is to
avoid a global war to end capitalism and find a peaceful way; “can we imagine
political institutions that might regulate today’s global patrimonial capitalism justly as
well as efficiently?” (471) The main reason the Great Recession did not become the
Great Depression was because of government action. But the actions were merely a
pragmatic response rather than “the return of the state” response to the first crisis of
“globalized patrimonial capitalism.” (473)
“The simplest way to measure the change in the government’s role in the economy is
to look at the total amount of taxes relative to national income.” (474) Between 1870
and WWI it was 10%. Between 1920 and 1980, the amount devoted to social
spending rose to 55% in Sweden and to 30% in the US. Britain and France were in
between. Between 1980 and 2010, “the tax share stabilized everywhere.” (476) And a
second great leap forward by the state is not likely to happen, nor is it likely to

decrease. Today about ½ of government spending goes to health and education and
about ½ goes to replacement incomes and transfer payments. (477) This translates as
15-25% of national income: “In other words, the growth of the fiscal state over the
last century basically reflects the constitution of the social state.” (479) So his point is
that modern redistribution theory is “built around a logic of rights” to health and
education for example. Modern redistribution “does not consist in transferring income
from the rich to the poor.” (479) But it should take its bearing from the 1789 French
model of social distinctions based only on “common utility.” Thus “equality is the
norm.” (480) But we are sort of stuck these days with neither going back to the 19th
century nor going forward beyond pensions, health, and education of the 20th century
to what is needed in the 21st century. He would like to entertain the notion of moving
from the current level of 50% of “public financing” to ”two-thirds to three-quarters of
national income.” (483)
The first task is to show how to generate more efficiency in government out of the
current 50% devoted mainly to pensions, education, and health. Current education
policies have neither reduced income inequality nor increased access to education, nor
increased social mobility. So much for the theory of merit generated “American
exceptionalism.” (484-485) There is unequal educational opportunity in the US. Who
can afford the high tuition fees? (And yet he admits that US universities are “the envy
of the world! (886)) Whatever we do with pension reform, privatization is not the
answer. Complexity is the problem and so uniformity is the answer.
The two tax innovations in the 20th century are the progressive income tax and the
progressive inheritance tax (it is unclear from his coverage whether these taxes were
the result of accident and force or deliberation and choice). They were created in
wartime and not thought through properly. It is not “the natural offspring of
democracy and universal suffrage.” (498) These two taxes need to be revisited. We
need to increase the progressive income tax just to establish and sustain the current
global 50% level. He mentions in passing that is ironic that the United States took the
lead in taxing “‘excessive’ incomes and fortunes” (505) at 70%. It could not have
been for revenue purposes. “The progressive tax”—and this seems odd in light of his
above remark that the progressive tax is not the natural offspring of democracy—“is
thus a relatively liberal method for reducing inequality….The progressive tax thus
represents thus represents an ideal compromise between social justice and individual
freedom.” (505) “The fear of coming to resemble Old Europe was no doubt part of the
reason for the American interest in progressive taxes.” (506) And then there were the
Great Depression and WWII.
(He wants to show that for most of the 20th century the US had tax rates that were
above the 70% threshold that he wants.)
The top income tax rate was about 25% under “Hoover’s disastrous presidency.”
(506) FDR raise it to 63% in 1933; 79% in 1937; and in the low 90%s from 1944-mid
1960s. It fell to 70% in the 1980s (506-507). “The top estate tax remained between
70% and 80% from the 1930s to the 1980s.” (507) And it was higher on inherited than
it was on earned income. But both the UK and US veered away from this “great
passion for equality’ in the 1970s and 1980s. (508) It fell from the 80-90% range to
28% after the Reagan tax reform of 1986. The countries “with the largest decreases in
their top tax rates are also the countries where the top earners’ share of national

income has increased the most.” (509) This totally transformed the determination of
executive salaries; the increase in executive pay has nothing to do with the naïve
theory of marginal productivity.
Here is his point: “levying confiscatory rates on top incomes is not only possible but
also the only way to stem the observed increase in high salaries.” (512) 80% on
incomes over $500,000 or $1m and 50-60% on incomes over $200,000 is well within
the reach of the United States. “The egalitarian pioneer ideal has faded into oblivion
and the New World may be on the verge of becoming the Old Europe of the twentyfirst century’s global economy. (514)
So how do we “regulate the globalized patrimonial capitalism of the twenty-first
century?” (515) “Rethinking the twentieth-century fiscal and social model and
adapting it to today’s world will not be enough.” (515) “The ideal tool would be a
progressive global tax on capital, coupled with a very high level of international
transparency.” “The global tax I am proposing is a progressive annual tax on global
wealth.” (517) “The primary purpose of the capital tax is not to finance the social
state but to regulate capitalism.” (518) There is a “contributive justification and an
incentive justification.” (524) And transparency about who owns what assets is vital
for this project. We need an automatic global “transmission of banking data.” (521)
Piketty seeks “a less violent and more efficient response to the eternal problem of
private capital and its return.” (532) The best response to r > g is a tax on capital. “In
this form, the tax on capital is a new idea, designed explicitly for the globalized
patrimonial capitalism of the twenty-first century.” (532)
In terms of transparency, “justice and efficiency,” taxes are better than debt for
funding government spending. Besides debt increases inequality. An exceptional tax
of 15% on private capital is a better way of reducing public debt than inflation or the
current austerity measures. (540-547) The Central Banks are not the solution; what
they do is to “redistribute wealth very quickly” to the rich. (551) If we want
improvement in the ECB, then we need “the countries of the Eurozone (or at any rate
those who are willing) to pool their public debts.” (558) And we need European
political union. (562) This is no more utopian than the attempt “to create a stateless
currency.” (561)
Piketty Conclusion
There is a central contradiction of 21st century global patrimonial capitalism: r > g
which is the key measure of inequality. “The right solution is a progressive annual tax
on capital.” (572) “The bipolar confrontations” between capitalism and communism
of 1917-1989 “are now clearly behind us.”

Lloyd Interpretation
Let’s begin at the beginning. Right below Picketty’s Introduction heading, we get a
blurb cited by Piketty from The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen,
Article 1, 1789: “Social distinctions can be based only on common utility.” (1)
Perhaps we need go no further than to grasp the philosophical/conceptual and political
indebtedness to J.J Rousseau that runs through this book. And in fact coming to grips
with the common utility declaration is the key to understanding both Piketty’s debt to

the past and his innovation in the 21st century. Piketty has a problem with socialism in
the 20th century. Thus he seeks guidance from the 18th century and the 19th century.
John Maynard Keynes was not a 19th century income/wealth inequality sort of
socialist. He was primarily interested in unemployment and the role that government
should and could play in filling in the gap left by fleeing capitalist investment in the
20th Century. His main aim was to put people to work so that they could consume and
get the economy out of crisis. Economic Growth—or what Pketty calls g-- was
Keynes’ objective. John Kenneth Galbraith and Michael Harrington, however, are not
in the strict Keynes mode of increasing g. They enter the scene after the Depression
and WWII. Galbraith is concerned that most production is unnecessary and most
consumption is conspicuous. We need public or environmental socialism, which
presumes that we have enough g to go around if only we cold make it go around more
fairly. Harrington is driven by a concern that a Great Society cannot exist unless the
public takes care of its “other America.” He is a social justice Catholic inspired kind
of socialist. And thus he would be more open to talking about the issue of r. But the
main problem for Harrington is the state’s heavy involvement in housing and
education programs. So the issues that drove 19th century socialists were altered by
20th century America rather than inspired the 19th century French Revolution. What
drove these three was that the market, laissez faire, rugged individualism might work
but for the few, but certainly did not work for the “forgotten man” and the
environment. The role of government in the 20th century was to create and fund
programs for those whom the market left behind or for issues that the market would
not address. They were socialists in the sense that they saw the market as more of a
failure than a success and government as more of a success than a failure.
But now we are in the 21st century and the French Revolution has much luster for
Piketty. The privatization and deregulation of Thatcher and Reagan, inspired more by
the common sense of the American Revolution/Constitution and the commercial
solutions of the Scottish enlightenment, derailed the 20th century socialist conquest of
capitalism, according to Piketty. It is time for the left to restate their case. And that
case is economic inequality.
Piketty’s book arrived at the right time—the 21st century—and in the right place—the
United States. And it retrieved the core 19th century socialist theme of inequality of
income and wealth. The real battle is the one fought during the French Revolution,
namely, genuine quality. It is a huge book, which is impressive in itself, full of data,
which is even more impressive in the land of social science. And not only data
covering ten years in one sector of the economy in one part of one country. We are
talking about 250 years of data on all sorts of inequality drawn from public records
available in the advanced economies of the capitalistic countries. This is no shortterm study that ends with the pathetic plea that more research funds are necessary.
We have as close to a definitive study on inequality as we can get. There is also a
prognosis: income/wealth inequality is likely to get worse over the coming years. So
let the shift from the Ancien Regime in France by way of the French Revolution be
our guide: get on the right side of history in the 21st century or, I assume, expect to
lose your head.
And this sets off the usual panic and excitement among American elites. The French
Revolution coming to the shores of America petrifies the Conservatives. So there is a

sort of panic over Piketty. The left are ecstatic. Finally we can replace the elitist
Declaration of Independence and Constitution with the egalitarian French Declaration
and the democratic concentration of power. For Piketty, the enduring battle is not
between the rugged individual and the forgotten man; it is between the rugged
egalitarian and the greedy 1%.
A powerful feature of the book is its sheer length and weight and depth and range of
coverage. It is enough to put you at a distance and bow in respect. Like Marx, there
are “laws” of capital and predictions. But unlike Marx, Piketty includes all sorts of
diversions into asterisks and what ifs that take up a lot of space without really
introducing skepticism into such a vast project. There is sufficient innuendo to
suggest that Marx was good for the 19th century, but we need a refresher for the 21st
century.
“What is the role of government in the production and distribution of wealth in the
twenty-first century, and what kind of social state is most suitable for the age”? (471)
This is the question that Piketty keeps returning to. And it is a vital question because
ever since the Great Society programs, the presumption among academics was that
public policy equals government policy and the presumption was that the federal
administration should have all sorts of programs to solve various problems. And
Piketty raises an important question: how one measures the role of government over
time. Why stop with government providing retirement, education and health care.
Why not also include “culture, housing, and travel”? (480) Piketty sees John Rawls
and his “difference principle” as the modern representative of the French model. (480)
In fn 21 on page 631 he cites the following from Rawls Theory of Justice: “Social
and economic inequalities…are just only if they result in compensating benefits for
everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of society.”
Thus Piketty wants to move beyond the 20th century European social model and
recapture the vitality of the French model of 1789. And his inspiration is the French
Declaration as supported by Rawls. The title of the book could easily have been
Rawls for the 21st century or the 21st century French Declaration of Equality.
Nevertheless, Piketty does claim to be novel about his contribution: “In this form, the
tax on capital is a new idea, designed explicitly for the globalized patrimonial
capitalism of the twenty-first century.” (532)
I think what makes Piketty also important is that implicitly at least he recognizes that
the Reagan revolution was not simply about cutting deficits and budgets and size and
interference. It was the reintroduction of the question: what should government do?
Which level of government and which branch of government? And is there a role for
intermediary institutions? One might go so far as to say that for Piketty the Reagan
revolution from the 1972 to the start of the 21st century has been a success because
inequality has returned and the Great Recession is due to that success. It has also
made “the return of the state” a real possibility. But perhaps this is to give too much
credit to the change made by the Reagan revolution. Did the state ever disappear or
go into limitation mode in the late 20th century? Apparently not, according to Piketty,
because the 20th century social state hasn’t really attacked the problem of r.
His solution, however, would probably the question what should government do
forever to rest. We need more than “the return of the state.” (473) We need

“confiscatory rates” on the top incomes. (512) But what happens if the electorate
doesn’t go for it? Does that matter to Piketty? At certain critical moments in his
argument, his proposals are tempered by the claim that this can only be done by
“collective deliberation” (see for example 513). He also declines to support the
notion that the 1% is responsible for the ills of the world. And when he suggests that
European nations should pool their public debts, that proposal is moderated to “those
who are willing.” (558) What should the level of public debt be in “an ideal society?”
“Only democratic deliberation can decide.” (562) Really? I thought it was r and g.
Isn’t “the golden rule” that r = g (563)? Isn’t the “central contradiction of capitalism”
that r > g? (571) Piketty makes the rather odd value statement that ”inequality is not
necessarily bad in itself: the key question is to decide whether it is justified, whether
there are reasons for it.” (19) Also (31) he says “I have no interest in denouncing
inequality or capitalism per se—especially since social inequalities are not in
themselves a problem as long as they are justified, that is, “founded only upon
common utility.” But the “common utility” of the French Revolution trumps
everything for Piketty.
He prefers a 21st century tax on capital to the 20th century progressive income tax in
order to control r. His criticism of the current distribution theory is that it bows too
much to the liberty narrative of the Declaration of Independence and not enough to
Article One of the French Declaration that “social distinctions can be based only on
common utility.” (479) In other words, Rousseau ought to trump Locke in theory, but
Locke trumps Rousseau in practice. And reforming Locke has produced the dilemma
of the current version of the rights generated social state.
One of Piketty’s greatest challenges to those who hold to the liberty narrative is to
explain and defend liberty position on inheritance. I would reinforce his challenge by
emphasizing what he hardly mentions, namely, that the liberty narrative, not just the
equality narrative, is based on a critique of the ancient/feudalism distribution of
property that had no link to earning or merit. He is correct to base the equality
narrative in that critique, but he does not address the not too subtle differences
between the two narratives on inheritance over the last two centuries. In other words,
where do they part company? It is clear they were allies at a critical moment. He does
not help us with this question. Ideally, we need a “progressive global tax on capital.”
(471) And this is derivative from the larger question: “What is the role of government
in the production and distribution of wealth in the twenty-first century, and what kind
of social state is most suitable for the age”? (471)
This is the point to recall that John Stuart Mill in his Political Economy prefers the
American model because distribution is voluntary rather than forced. And doesn’t the
liberty principle suggest that I can give my inheritance unequally to family members?
Piketty’s response is that equal distribution within the family was the norm in the
United States. He is correct in noting that both Revolutions were based on the premise
that the earth belonged to the living, but surely the attitude toward the past was
different in each country? The French attitude was down right hostile! And Piketty
doesn’t raise and answer the question of when and why did voluntary rather than
forced inheritance come to pass in America so that today there is virtually no serious
inheritance law at all. I totally agree that inheritance is a major issue for the
continued case for both capitalism and socialism and those like Piketty who want to
move into new paradigms, but he leaves many questions unasked and unanswered.

Piketty suggests from time to time that if we let people make their own choices then
(growing) inequality will be the outcome in society. This seems to me to be saying
that legal and constitutional provisions for equality are insufficient. More than
voluntary consent is needed and force is justified. Is he going so far as to suggest that
people will not live in accordance with certain well laid down principles? Then we
need government to require them to behave in accordance with the vital principle of
equality. But why would the people elect officials who pushed equality on them if
they were naturally disposed to equality in the first place? Wouldn’t such a people
punish officials who deviated from equality? Is the job of a representative basically,
not just prudentially, to ignore the inclinations of the people toward liberty? Is it ever
wrong under the Piketty model for the representatives to inform the people that they
are asking for too much equality? What happens if the population doesn’t want higher
taxation and it takes an emergency like a war or a depression –shocks—to get taxes
supported?
In fn 33 on page 639 he bemoans the electoral outcome of 1972 in the US. “George
McGovern, the Democratic candidate, went so far as to propose a top rate of 100% for
the largest inheritance taxes (the rate was then 77%) as part of his plan to introduce a
guaranteed minimum income. McGovern’s crushing defeat by Nixon marked the
beginning of the end of the United States’ enthusiasm for redistribution.” But I would
suggest that McGovern actually put the Democratic Party on the course of ultimate
progressivism and this is the defining core of the Democratic Part in the 21st century.
By the way, Piketty does not mention that the turnout of the 18-40 year olds peaked in
1972. Has that demographic turned away from the progressivism they learned in
college and expressed in authentic civic engagement? Bill Clinton’s restraining
influence disappeared with the end of his presidency. But not Hillary care!
Piketty seems to be arguing: We need new and high tax laws to reduce wealth and
income inequality. The market won’t correct the problem because the market is the
problem. And the question then is: even if that inequality is earned, do we need taxes?
At times, he is unnecessarily ambiguous on this point. He should just come out and
say—as he pretty much does in Part Four-- which there really is no coherent or
relevant argument for any inequality. His argument for a global capital tax is NOT so
that the existing social state can better fund its programs. Rather it is to regulate
capitalism. In other words what is driving Piketty is the very presence of inequality
and he has found the culprit and the solution has to be global. Is there a range of
inequality that is OK for Piketty? Only that which is consistent with the general
welfare. And who decides the general welfare? Should we consult the history of the
French Revolution between 1789 and Napoleon? He is silent on that point.
Along the way, a number of well-known economists and theories over the last couple
of hundred years get roughed up. And that is fine, they deserved to be reviewed. But
the number of people and the ease of dismissal are eye opening. For example, Simon
Kuznets is ideological on historical data and natural growth; Robert Solow on the
stages of economic growth is way off. Pareto’s optimum can be discarded. Gini’s
coefficient is simplistic. The Cobb-Douglas production function is questionable.
Marginal productivity theory can be thrown out of the window; it is naive. As is
Modigliano’s “my money and I die together at the same moment on the same day”
assumption. Keynes is unclear because “he does not mention r = g” and he ”does not

discuss public accumulation.” (652) True, Irving Fisher’s Presidential address is
lauded because he recognized the problem of income inequality. And Milton
Friedman gets a two page accolade: “The work of Friedman and other Chicago
School economists fostered suspicion of the ever-expanding state and created the
intellectual climate in which the conservative revolution of 1970-1980 became
possible.” (549)
It is also reasonable to suppose, in Piketty’s reading, that everyone who lived on the
same side of the street with Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, Hayek and Friedman were
living the same illusionary life and lie. This is certainly true of Gary Becker.
And while it is true that Piketty sees more to economic life than economic science in
his appeal to culture, history, and literature—for example see his frequent references
to 19th century literature and 20th century movies—he boasts that he is, in effect, the
first to ask the right questions, accumulate the correct data, and express the
complexity of economic life in easily usable formulas. They are different and more
nuanced than earlier formulas and downplay the tendency to inevitability portrayed by
earlier economists. But Piketty still talks about dynamic laws and predicting the
future. It is not going too far to say he sees himself as the first great economist of the
21st century. “The sources on which this book draws are more extensive than any
previous author has assembled.” (571)
It is clear, to me anyway, that Piketty is interested in the same question that Marx and
the socialists are interested in and not just because the accumulation and
concentration of capital is unfair per se. Equally important is that it can be shown
scientifically to be unfair. In order to show this, however, Piketty has to do what all
previous generations of thinkers have had to do with regard to both the liberty and
equality narrative, namely, “correct,” or update their mentors and teachers from
previous generations. So he corrects Marx concerning the accumulation and
concentration of capital and applies that to the conditions of the 21st century. One of
the main influences of Marx on Piketty is his implicit assumption that g will be close
to zero. Thus, the concern of both Marx and Piketty with r or the creation and
dominance of capital, and the claim by both that there is a central contradiction to
capitalism. Piketty, however, does not have the stomach for violence. And he has this
wonderful, yet unexplainable, preference for “democratic debate” over “mathematical
certainties.” (571) He wants to move beyond Marx without losing Marx’s concern for
“questions of capital and class inequality.” (655)
One possibly unintended thought that Piketty generated for me was the dynamic
relation between the 1% of the population and the amount of tax revenue. Take
California. The 1% pays 50% of the California government revenue. While that
percentage remains pretty constant the actual amount of revenue does not. The vast
bulk of the 1% wealth comes from the performance of the stock markets. Thus when
the markets go down—as they did from 2007-2010—then California government
faces a huge deficit and also the delimma of raising taxes even further on the 1% and
or cutting education, health, and pension programs. In 2015, California is awash in a
surplus because of the rebounding stock market. Few people—see George Skelton of
the Los Angeles Times and Senator Bob Herzberg—are calling for a fundamental
reform in the tax code to even out these variations in revenue. So I wish Piketty had
spent more time talking about the dynamic of r in relation to tax revenue and less time

simply focusing on the ”inevitable” g > r hypothesis. Maybe he could persuade the
huge audience he is attracting to focus on the internal dynamic of r and its relation to
revenue and social programs. Also, there seems to be a tipping point where unless g is
regularly high, then the social programs of the left can’t get funded!
Another area of possibly unintended thought that Piketty provoked in me was the
similarity of his argument to the content of the Presidential announcement by US
Senator Bernie Sanders in May 2015. Sanders unabashedly went after the 1% and
warned them that their days of dominance were/ought to be over. His plan is to tax
the 1% in order to pay for free schools and free health care, a minimum wage and
environmental policies. Now just because Sanders describes himself as a socialist or a
democratic socialist doesn’t make him one. Commentators on the left and right aren’t
challenging his attachment to the terminology. But even the presence of that
consensus does not make him a socialist.
What is interesting is like Piketty, Sanders is reviving and updating the 19th cenutry
concern with inequality per se. Actually, Sanders goes beyond Piketty. Although he
is a bit fuzzy on how much inequality he would tolerate, Piketty does distinguish
between inherited income and earned income, at least up to a point. Put differently, up
to a point he distinguishes between inheritance and meritocracy. Sanders does not
make the distinction (at least he has not in his announcements). It doesn’t matter
whether you worked for it; you have it and others do not. This is the sort of class think
that the 19th century socialists articulated. It doesn’t matter to Sanders that part of the
1% may not only have earned it, but be very sympathetic to the issue of social justice.
I wish a study were available on what percentage of the 1% are supporters of left
wing causes. Sanders wants to get rid of private campaign financing. Actually,
environmental policies are included, following Galbraith’s socialism, in Sanders’s
agenda.
Final thought. Just remember, Piketty explains inequality by r > g. “This is the
fundamental force for divergence.” (422) Forget market forces or universal suffrage
as solutions for inequality. And he would rather not have a violent solution. Why is it
not central to his project that g rise? He says it will be low for generations. He is
concerned instead that g will never rise as fast as r. OK, but what if we tried to push
g to rise. How would we do it? It won’t happen, says Piketty. He is not really
interested in pushing g up because he thinks that g is pretty much stable. He is more
interested in closing the gap between r and g by claiming that g will never catch up
with r and thus we must reduce r. And he makes the moral claim that to reduce r > g
is equality. The moral source of this claim is the French Revolution’s embrace of
equality and Rawls theory of justice. While Piketty often links justice and efficiency,
with a touch of transparency and democracy, my thought is that, if a priority has to be
made, justice trumps if a priority. Europe, Piketty says, has never ben so rich. “What
is true and shameful, on the other hand, is that this vast national wealth is very
unequally distributed. Private wealth rests on public poverty.” (567) But the solution
must be made “after democratic debate.” (567) I end on that paradoxical note.

